Using the LDS NL model of utterance interpretation being developed by Gabbay and Kempson (cf. 17, 29, 30] ), this paper demonstrates how the dynamics of the proof process adopted explains con gurational restrictions imposed on the interpretation of elliptical fragments. The blurring of traditional semantic and syntactic dichotomies in the LDS NL proof-theoretic reconstruction of interpretation successfully provides a basis for predicting the array o f v ariation displayed by di erent elliptical forms. The logic adopted is a composite system of a type logic nested within a database logic. Two resource-sensitive sub-types of Conditional Introduction form the basis for explaining the ellipsis data. The result is a demonstration of how the simple device of adding labels to an inference system can provide a useful tool not only at the meta-logic level of comparing alternative logic and grammar formalisms, but also at the level of explaining natural language data.
1 Ellipsis: the puzzle Ellipsis phenomena as in (1) pose a particular challenge under assumptions of current linguistic orthodoxy:
(1) John wants to visit Mary in hospital.
Sue too (i) Sue does too (ii) Sue wants to too (iii)
They provide evidence on the one hand for a purely semantic/pragmatic explanation of how i n terpretation is assigned to the simple fragmentary string (cf. Dalrymple et al. 12] , Pr ust et al. 41]), and contrarily on the other hand for a con gurationally-based syntactic explanation requiring the assignment o f r i c her structure to the string than is visible (cf. Lappin 33] , Fiengo and May 1 4 ] ). Pragmatically, they constitute an extreme case of context-dependency of natural-language interpretation, with various forms, all of which require reconstruction by the hearer of some salient c o n textually provided one place predicate as part of the process of interpretation. Moreover the interpretation of elliptical fragments may depend exclusive l y o n t h e w ay in which t h e hearer builds up such a one-place predicate as interpretation, for a fragment m a y b e ambiguous despite lack o f a n y a m biguity in its antecedent. In (2) for example a single interpretation of the rst conjunct (with his xed as picking out`John'), is paired with possible interpretations of the second conjunct either as`Harry admires John's mother' or as`Harry admires Harry's mother':
490 Ellipsis in a Labelled Deduction System (2) John admires his mother, and so does Harry.
However, despite semantic/pragmatic similarity b e t ween di erent elliptical forms, distinct forms nevertheless display di erent potential for interpretation. First there is a subject restriction, applicable only to V P ellipsis as in (1ii) and (1iii). Thus the socalled bare argument ellipsis form in (1i) (Reinhart 43] ) can be used to mean either that Sue wants to visit Mary in hospital, or that John wants to visit Sue in hospital.
(1ii) and (1iii), \V P ellipsis", can only mean the rst of these. Secondly, both forms of ellipsis are sensitive to restrictions on their interpretation analogous to restrictions on wh-gap construal, but in di erent w ays. Parallelling the acceptability o f ( 3 ) (3) Who i did John deny that Bill had interviewed e i ?
bare argument ellipsis allows reconstruction across clausal boundaries, giving rise to an interpretation of the fragment in (4) as`Mary did not deny t h a t s h e h a d t a k en the icecream':
(4) Mary denied that she had taken the cakes. But not the icecream.
Again parallelling wh-gap construal and the unacceptability of (5): (5) Who i did John go out with a woman who is studying e i ?
the fragment in (6) precludes the construction of an interpretation which w ould involve reconstructing the fragment across the relative clause boundary of the antecedent sentence as`John is also going out with a woman who is studying Racine': (6) John is going out with a woman who is studying Palestrina. Racine too.
(7), similarly, allows no reconstruction across the relative clause boundary 1 (7) They are interviewing the man who Bill assaulted. But not Harry.
The apparent \subjacency" e ect does not extend to wh-islands or sentential subjects.
Unlike the unacceptability of (8){ (9) (8) Who do you know w h y e i stole from the shop? (9) Who was that John doted on e i clear? (10) and (11) fully license reconstruction of the fragment across the intervening clausal boundary: 1 The data appear to vary according as the inferential e ect of the fragment v aries. Fragments as additions such as these preclude reconstruction across a relative clause boundary. Corrections and fragment wh questions do not (Deirdre Wilson and Robin Cooper pc) (i) I've been befriending the man who stole diamonds from Harrods. Sorry rubies.
(ii) \I'm giving 200,000 ecus to the institution that obtains the most money from a European foundation." \Which foundation?" I return to these data later.
1. ELLIPSIS: THE PUZZLE 491 (10) I know w h y Bill stole from the shop. But not Sam. (11) That John doted on Mary was clear. And Sue too.
This bifurcation of subjacency e ects, some carried over to ellipsis, others not, does not extend to VP ellipsis. To the contrary, though V P -ellipsis reconstruction might seem not to provide the environment for testing such subjacency e ects since it only allows an interpretation in which the subject of the elliptical V P is reconstructed as the subject of the recovered predicate, with no possibility of reconstructing it into some subordinate position, there are subjacency e ects none-the-less in antecedentcontained VP ellipsis such as (12){ (15) , and these exactly parallel wh-gap dependencies: (12) John interviewed everyone that Bill said Sue did. (13) John interviewed everyone that I know the man who did. (14) John interviewed everyone that I know w h y John did. (15) John interviewed everyone who that Bill had was clear.
There thus appear to be complex syntactic limitations on the reconstruction of elliptical expressions which a purely interpretive reconstruction would have no means of explaining. However, explaining these phenomena in terms of complex syntactic structure intrinsic to the elliptical expression involves analysing the elliptical form under an interpretation, and this leads to multiple formal ambiguity n o t o n l y o f t h e elliptical fragment b u t also in the unambiguous antecedent f r o m w h i c h its interpretation is derived (cf. Fiengo and May 14] ). In consequence such a solution does not reconstruct the semantic/pragmatic observation that ellipsis involves a mapping from some weak speci cation of content o n to some more fully speci ed interpretation relative to the context in which it occurs. In this paper I adopt the LDS NL strategy (Gabbay and Kempson 17] ) of de ning subject proof-theoretically through a control label and particularised form of ! Elimination and, with a correspondingly distinct subtype of ! Introduction, analyse the di erent forms of ellipsis in terms of two types of ! Introduction. This simple proof-theoretic distinction is, I shall claim, su cient when set within the general framework of LDS NL both to capture the diverse con gurational constraints on the interpretation process and nevertheless to retain the semantic/pragmatic insight t h a t the linguistic input underdetermines the proposition which is its assigned content. In particular, the use of a logic more stringent than a simple typed logic provides just the additional restrictiveness needed.
LDS NL : a summary
The point o f departure for all explanations within the LDS NL framework is the following pair of informal observations, and I impose as a minimum criterion of success on any account of elliptical fragments that it re ect these.
492 Ellipsis in a Labelled Deduction System (i) Utterance interpretation is a left-right reasoning process in which, by the information encoded with each word in sequence, the hearer progressively builds a structure which she takes to correspond to the interpretation intended by the speaker.
(ii) The input to interpretation provided by words underdetermines the content a ttributed to them in context, and as part of the interpretation process, the hearer has to make c hoices for all under-determined aspects.
It is this inferential activity of utterance interpretation which the LDS NL system purports to model. The claim of Gabbay and Kempson 17] and Kempson 28 , 2 9 , 3 0 ] i s that this inferential task is a goal-driven task of labelled natural deduction. Summarising, we assume the task for the hearer is to establish the proposition expressed by t h e words the speaker has used, a formula of logical type t whose content i s t o b e e s t a blished through steps of inference, in part deduction over the logical type-speci cations of the provided words (as in other parsing as deduction frameworks|Pereira 38, 3 9 ], K onig 31], Moortgat 36] , Hepple 22] , Morrill et al. 37] ). Some of the words provide a labelled formula (=`declarative unit'), the word itself being the label, the formula being the logical type speci cation associated with that word. Some provide annotations on those labelled formulae imposing an order on their application (in particular the concept of subject is expressed as an ordering on the premises that one di erentiated premise be used last in a chain of deductions leading to : t.). Others provide instructions on the requisite proof con guration to be built e.g. wh expressions, which dictate the building of an independent database linked to its host only through uni cation of a term of the labelling algebra in each database 2 . Yet others impose extra choices, as in anaphora and, as we shall see, ellipsis. The overall task is to build a labelled proof con guration using instructions as they are given by t h e words in sequence once and once only with a goal of deriving a formula : t for each clause, and ultimately for the composite whole, where is some complex expression of the labelling algebra . The e ect of the labels is not only to project semantic information but also (i) to impose extra restrictions on allowable type inferences within a database, and (ii) to express relations between individual databases.
The logical system within which this deductive task is set is composite. First there is the logic whereby individual databases are established, a type-logical system with inference de ned over labelled formulae in which the formula is a logical type, and the label is a pair (c 1 c 2 ) i n w h i c h c 1 is an expression of a predicate algebra, c 2 is some control feature. The two rules of the ! Logic are Modus Ponens and ! Introduction.
2 Initial W h expressions are analysed as a goal speci cation on the database whose construction they initiate, requiring that at some unspeci ed point in that database an assumption of the form u wh : e be constructed, u wh a m e t a variable. This predicts the three properties characteristic of such expressions|their invisibility for purposes of anaphoric dependence from this position, the need for an associated empty position at which the information they project is assumed, and the transfer of this information down through the proof con guration to this point. Cf. Kempson 28 It is this sub-type of Modus Ponens and of ! Introduction which are the particularised inference rules associated with the concept of subject. (Which premise it is that bears the annotation S =`use last' is identi ed by in ection.). The two sub-types of !Introduction are used solely for ellipsis. The restriction that all information projected by t h e w ords must be used once and once only is also expressed as a global restriction '.
494 Ellipsis in a Labelled Deduction System Labels are allowed to be both simple and complex|indeed whole databases may a c t as labels. The rules I and II are generalised to allow for such cases, via the addition of the concept of`metadeclarative unit'. A meta-declarative unit is a database of premises that uniquely proves some conclusion : A where A is the ty p e o f a n d To reconstruct the possible underdeterminacy of content p r o vided by natural-language input, we de ne a set of abstract variables which act as metavariables. Such abstract variables are de ned by special rules of interpretation mapping them onto sets of expressions (rather than onto sets of individuals). Such v ariables are assigned as the lexical speci cation of pronominal elements. Natural language quanti cation is also realised through such metavariables. Adapting the pattern of predicate-logic reasoning with quanti ed formulae to this proof-theoretic perspective on natural-language interpretation, determiners map directly onto restricted variables of distinguished sorts|every onto free variables, inde nites onto dependent v ariables, and so on. We wish however to model aspects of under-determinacy in the interpretation of determiners, and accordingly assume that this mapping is in two steps. The lexical speci cation of a determiner provides a metavariable for each determiner, these metavariables ranging over di erent sorts of logical expression, that projected by every ranging over free variables 3 , the inde nite article a over dependent v ariables (cf. p. 498), the (like pronouns) ranging over all logical expressions of type e, and so on. For each such metavariable, the second step is to choose the appropriate logical expression, a choice which is trivial in the case of every, b u t i n volves a nontrivial choice from other labels in the case of pronouns, the de nite article and, as I shall argue later, the inde nite article also. Wh expressions also project a metavariable as label to a formula, but indirectly through the license to construct such an assumption (cf. fn.2). The result is a system projected via lexical type-assignments which are invariably of the lowest type, all determiners projecting a metavariable of type e. 4 1. ELLIPSIS: THE PUZZLE 495 In addition to the !Logic there is a logical system de ning licensed relations between independently generated databases as units, expressing relations (e.g. temporal) holding between labels of those databases, or between labels within those databases such as LINK, etc. This system is de ned exclusively through the labels and is not reduced to the type-theoretic system internal to individual databases. LINK is a relation between a pair of databases We thereby generate s i : fJo : e like:e ! (e ! t) (x student(x) & clever(x)) : eg from Jo likes every student who is clever via s i : fJo : e like : e ! (e ! t) (x student(x)) : eg, s j : fu wh =(x student(x)) : e clever : e ! tg, LINK(s i ((x student(x)) : e), s j (u wh : e) u wh =(x student(x))). Additional rules need to be de ned for other relations between databases: concatenation, disjunction and the 496 Ellipsis in a Labelled Deduction System relation of labelling (cf. fn.6). A s e n tence made of a sequence of words hw 1 : : : w n i is wellformed if and only if there is at least one database from which a unique conclusion : t for type t and label is derivable using all information as projected by the sequence hw 1 : : : w n i once and once only. The logical system within which such conclusions are derived is composite, with a type-driven conditional logic nested in a logic framework for licensing linked labelled databases.
The construction process and island constraints
To generate such labelled databases, there is a construction algorithm driven by lexical speci cations which incrementally builds proof trees from the linear sequence of words on a left to right basis. Successor functions are de ned for a node-to-node mapping distinguished according to the function of the entry at that node. M is the node corresponding to the point of departure, with successor functions as follows: an nfunction for building a database-node, a d-function for building a node for a declarative unit, a d function for building a node which is the result of a step of inference, a g-node for a goal speci cation, an L-function for building a node for a label, an Ffunction for building a node for a formula. The result is nodes described as`nM' = the node for a database at the source node m',`Ld i nM' =`the node for the label to the ith entry in the database at node nM', etc. Using these successor functions, lexical speci cations are de ned, dictating modi cation to the current proof con guration. These speci cations encode restrictions on the order of entries within the database, allowing the type logic to be a simple conditional logic which does not re ect leftright order of premises. With this incremental building of proof structure, syntactic constraints are predicted without extra machinery, or additional operators, through restrictions that emerge from the incremental process of establishing the proof which the words dictate. One example is the restriction of no wh-gap dependency into relative clauses. This is predicted from two assumptions. On the one hand, the assumption that wh-initial expressions project goal speci cations on a single database drives the search for a point a t w h i c h the assumption u wh : e corresponding to the gap can be constructed. On the other hand, composite databases are assumed to be projected by relations de ned between them, such as LINK, which are not de ned in the type-logical system. These two assumptions combine together to guarantee that a g a p f o r a wh-expression cannot be constructed across a relative clause boundary, because the target imposed by t h e wh expression determines that the proof domain within which the corresponding gap assumption must be constructed is the database on which the target is imposed and not any other: 5 (16) 0 ) for example, the parsing process, as induced by the relative which in s 1 , imposes the need in s 1 to reach a conclusion of the form (y wh ) : t within that local reasoning task, y wh linked to m i (m i a metavariable projected from the determiner that). This goal speci cation and the restriction that all information projected by t h e words be used cannot however both be ful lled for what follows is the sequence Bill, dislike, and everyone, and the information projected by e a c h of these words must be used. Moreover the construction of the assumption associated with the wh expression in s 1 cannot be constructed in s 2 , because the goal speci cation associated with the wh is a goal imposed on databases de ned within the ! Logic and the relation of LINK between two databases is not de ned within the ! Logic system. By de nition a reasoning task locally imposed on some database has to be ful lled within that database. Hence the ungrammaticality of (16) , and the lack of dependency between a wh expression and a gap within a relative clause. This restriction does not apply to complement clauses because the databases projected from them are contained as a label in the database of the verb to which they are a complement. In precluding wh-gap dependencies into relative clauses as a consequence of the composite nature of the logic framework, the analysis might seem to face di culties with counter-examples such as: (17) The Mercedes is the car which I k n o w someone who will rent (18) Theories we need someone who works on are DRT and Categorial grammar These examples are somewhat peripheral in English, but there is parametric variation across languages as to the acceptability o f s u c h structures which suggests that a preclusion of wh-gap dependencies into relative clauses in virtue of the logical system is too strong. However, within this proof-theoretic perspective s u c h exceptions can be given a principled explanation, preserving the logical restriction. The examples in (17){(18) involve either an inde nite or de nite determiner as head, and this is observed across all languages which systematically license such exceptions. In such languages, of which the Scandinavian languages are a well-known example (cf. Maling and Zaenen 35]), wh-gap dependency is not unrestricted: as reported by Maling and Zaenen, a particular form of interpretation is required, with the head determiner of the gap-containing relative clause being in some sense functionally dependent o n t h e g a p . This phenomenon seems to present a puzzling interaction between semantic properties of the head determiner and what is otherwise a language-invariant structural restriction. The phenomenon, which carries over to ellipsis, can however be explained in terms of the semantic analysis required for inde nites, given a proof-theoretic perspective. The LDS NL framework, building on the assumption that databases like a l l other inferential units have an assigned label, de nes inde nite expressions as dependent names, dependent on either some preceding label paired with type e, o r o n some previously constructed database label. The particular choice of dependency is an anaphoric choice analogous to pronominals, with inde nites projected from the lexicon as a metavariable ranging over dependent names. This analysis projects two possible interpretations for sentences such a s Every student read a book without requiring movement of the expression projected by a book to any higher position. We might represent t h e t wo i n terpretations informally as: (s 1 s 1 < s NOW read(f(x))(x)) : t for x a f r e e v ariable ranging over students f(x), f(s 1 ) dependent v ariables ranging over books s 1 a unit of time preceding the time of utterance (s 1 s 1 < s NOW read(f(s 1 ))(x)) : t Unlike the discourse referents of Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp and Reyle 25]), these dependent names are always existential in force, being constructed relative 1. ELLIPSIS: THE PUZZLE 499 to either some world-time index or some other variable 6 . (The dependency to be de ned is broader than that standardly associated with skolem functions, in being a dependency which m a y yield`wide-scope' existential e ects in the semantics.) Once having introduced such dependent names, the potential for mapping onto a dependent name will automatically extend to de nite NPs, because, being anaphoric, they can choose as value any label paired with type e. This analysis of inde nites enables us to explain the apparent exceptions to the restriction debarring wh-gap dependencies into relative clauses. A language may license constructions of the type displayed in (15){ (16) as wellformed if the name lexically projected by the determiner heading the clause containing the gap can be identi ed as being dependent on that constructed gap assumption in its own relative clause. Consequent upon such identi cation, a representation of that assumption will be contained not only within the database projected from this relative clause but also, as part of a name, within the database initiated by the initial wh, and from this position its occurrence in that name will satisfy the target set by the initial wh expression without violating the dynamics of the proof discipline. (Formally what is required is a de nition of the ! Logic system to incorporate within the labelling algebra the process of substitution whereby such anaphoric elements are identi ed: cf. MeyerViol this volume for a de nition of a predicate logic which w ould provide the requisite algebra). The required procedure, schematically, for the construal of (17) is (17 0 ): 6 The di erence in availability for anaphoric dependence between the free variables projected from every and these names across antecedent and consequent of a conditional depends on the analysis of conditional sentences as`(s i : m) : n',`si : m' projected from the antecedent,` n' projected from the consequent. The lack of availability of some variable x free in m for anaphoric dependency is because s i : m is itself a complete proof domain and any v ariable x is free only within that proof domain. Hence If every student i saw me, I ignored him i . Conversely, Every student i ignored me, if he i saw me is acceptable, because the database without its label as projected by the consequent requires its label to complete its proof domain, so an instance of a variable introduced in the database projected from the consequent m a y h a ve a subsequent instance in the database projected from the following antecedent. The freer availability of some dependent name c(s i ) constructed either in m or in n for the purposes of anaphoric dependence in n, a s d i s p l a yed by If a student i saw John, he i ignored him, A student i ignored me, if he i saw me, turns on the fact that m and n have a s a p o i n t of commonality the label s i on which the name constructed from the inde nite depends. s 3 (y wh : e) y wh =(u dependent person(u dependent ))) 9 (y wh =u dependent person(u dependent )) : e 10 rent : e ! (e ! t) 11 (x wh =v the car(v the )) : e 12 rent(x wh =v the car(v the ))(y wh =u dependent person(u dependent )) : t The critical step is at step 14, for it is at this point t h a t h a ving established the complex predicate`person(u dependent ) & rent(x wh =v the car(v the ))(u dependent ,person(u dependent ))', the dependent variable instantiating u dependent projected by the inde nite article is identi ed as the name`the one who will rent the car', a name whose form| f RENT (x wh =(v the ,car(v the )))'|re ects the construction of the LINKed database s 3 which projects this information. Moreover this name critically contains as a subpart the representation`x wh =(v the ,car(v the ))' speci ed in the goal for s 2 . If this is the 1. ELLIPSIS: THE PUZZLE 501 strategy the hearer chooses in interpreting (17) , this name (with its representation of the label`x wh =(v the ,car(v the )) 0 will be in the proof domain s 2 which has a target that some conclusion be derived using`x wh =(v the , car(v the ))'. Given the presence of the words I, know, and someone, this strategy is indeed the only way of meeting the goal speci cation imposed on s 2 at step 4. The target speci cation imposed by t h e presence of the rst relative pronoun in such s e n tences will therefore be satis ed as long as the language in question allows this form of indirect satisfaction of that target speci cation|through a process analogous to anaphora resolution. It is this which is the source of the parametric variation, not variation according as the language does or does not constitute a counterexample of the general logic discipline. English in general does not allow such indirect satisfaction of the requirement to construct the necessary assumption: the presence of the`gap' assumption licensed by the wh expression must be projected by construction only with no morphological form corresponding to the gap itself as trigger 7 . In the Scandinavian languages, in contrast, the pronominal system is freely used for the construction of the gap assumption initiated by the wh expression: Swedish and Norwegian, as Maling and Zaenen report, have resumptive pronouns which function as gaps and which in relative clauses display a l l the properties of gaps. Given the analysis of inde nites as requiring anaphoric resolution like pronominals, we w ould predict that inde nites, like pronominals, would also interact with wh-gap dependencies, allowing the name to be identi ed as dependent on the gap assumption, the languages thereby licensing apparent island violations relative t o the construal of the inde nite as itself a function on the gap. The particular form of construal with the head determiner dependent on the gap within the modifying relative will in fact be essential to the wellformedness of any s u c h wh-gap dependency across a relative clause boundary, for it is only if it is so identi ed that the goal speci cation imposed by the initial wh is met within the requisite proof domain. This corresponds exactly to the restriction on interpretation reported by Maling and Zaenen| (19) (19) and (21) are acceptable because an interpretation is available with the determiner head of the relative clause construed as dependent on the gap inside the relative. (20) and (22) are not because the de nite article is construed as picking out a xed entity, and so does not provide the necessary dependent name which w ould satisfy the whimposed target. The variation across languages with respect to wh-gap dependency is thu s n o t a v ariation in the overall logical system, but rather variation in the stringency of the target speci cation assigned by the initial wh expression|expressed as the composition of functions in the goal speci cation (u wh ) : t. Families of languages are de ned according as the language has a more or less strict requirement o n h o w that target speci cation is met. Some languages, e.g. English, impose the requirement upon a given local database that u wh : e be constructed as an assumption which i s t o c o m bine with other premises by steps of Modus Ponens to yield (u wh ) : t. Other languages, e.g. Swedish/Norwegian, allow this target to be met through any o f the operations available in this local domain|by constructed assumption, or by anaphoric choice, equally. The result is an account of the restriction precluding wh-gap dependency into relative clauses that licenses parametric variation within limits strictly set by t h e logic discipline. What has made it possible is the proof-theoretic mode of presentation, for it is the analysis of inde nites as names explicitly recording the source of their dependent construal that makes apparent w h y i t i s the inde nite and de nite determiners as heads that provide the exceptions to an otherwise strongly universal constraint 8 .
Bare argument fragments as substitution in an LDS NL Framework
It is this proof-theoretic presentation of content which provides the basis of ellipsis interpretation. Ellipsis, recall, falls into the sub-types of bare argument ellipsis and VP ellipsis. The former I shall claim involves a substitution process founded on Introduction re ecting exactly the properties of this rule as it applies within the composite logic system. Informally, what the hearer does when faced with the minimal amount of information presented by a fragment is to use information she already has on-line to construct the requisite interpretation, analogous to anaphoric resolution. An entire preceding database is duly used to reconstruct an interpretation, substituting the fragment i n place of some selected premise in the antecedent database. The result is the three interpretations (23i) Mary insisted that Sue visit Bill in hospital.
BARE ARGUMENT FRAGMENTS AS SUBSTITUTION 503 (23ii) Joan insisted that Mary visit Bill in hospital. (23iii) Joan insisted that Sue visit Mary in hospital.
Not all accounts model this as a phenomenon of ellipsis. Dalrymple et al. 12] h o wever rightly emphasise 9 that the phenomenon of ellipsis involves abstraction from some independently available source. They de ne predicate ellipsis in terms of higher order uni cation between some suitably created abstract on the antecedent conjunct and a predicate variable with which the presented elliptical expression can combine. Equivalently, these simple cases can be modelled as rst order uni cation involving abstraction on the antecedent database with application of the result by Modus Ponens to the newly presented premise projected by the fragment (an analysis independently proposed by P r ust et al. 41 ] for VP ellipsis): 9 From the observation that I put everything away in the cupboard but the cake is not equivalent to the inconsistent I put everything away in the cupboard but I didn't put the cake away in the cupboard, Reinhart 43] argues that bare argument ellipsis is not a phenomenon of ellipsis at all. She posits an analysis in terms of phrasal coordination, positing extraction of the correllated item (here everything) to create phrasal conjunction of the two correlated items at LF, the extraction process itself being used to explain the parallelism with wh-gap dependency. A subsequent semantic process of quantifying in guarantees that the conjoined unit is interpreted as though back in the original position of the correlated item. This analysis might be appropriate for except phrases and but NP phrases (cf. Lappin 34] for arguments that it is not), but it is not appropriate for the principal bare argument ellipsis cases. Such a n analysis would predict the wellformedness of Bill met. And Lucy too. on the basis of Bill and Lucy met, and the equivalence of Jo plays duets. Lucy too. with Jo and Lucy play duets. It also predicts that the limits on interpretation for these fragments should correspond exactly to the wh-gap dependency on which their analysis is modelled. But though the construal of fragments appears to be sensitive to relative clause and some adjunct-clause boundaries, it is insensitive to boundaries caused by the existence of an initial wh in the complement clause (`wh-islands') as in (i) or the boundary created by clauses in subject position as in (iii): (i) ? What i do you wonder why Mary is taking e i ? (ii) I a m w ondering why Mary took Prozac. And Lofepramine too (iii) What i is dancing in e i fun? (iv) Dancing in the rain is fun, but not the snow. Whatever similarity there is between ellipsis construal and wh-gap dependencies, it cannot be analysed as involving the very same process. (23 0 ) corresponds to interpretation (23iii). This analysis re ects the process of building the interpretation directly, the proof-theoretic mode of presentation preserving all structural aspects of that interpretation process, from some weakly speci ed input to a projection of propositional content 10 . Each o n e of the set of steps needed to derive insist(visit(Bill)(Sue))(Joan):t in s 1 is a step of Modus Ponens given our 10 It might seem that !Introduction is not applicable here since Bill:e is not an assumption with which a n y database is opened. However, given annotations such a s S =`use last' on premises, the order of application of the premises is fully determined by the labelling algebra. From a proof-theoretic point of view, order in the database is accordingly irrelevant.
2. BARE ARGUMENT FRAGMENTS AS SUBSTITUTION 505 general form of Modus Ponens applying to metadeclarative units and carrying up in the labelling algebra only the predicate logic expressions of that algebra. Any one of the premises Joan:e, S u e : e, Bill:e can accordingly be removed from the database s 1 as a local box exit rule, and by a s t e p of Modus Ponens be replaced by Mary:e, predicting the ambiguity of (23) directly. We predict directly the diversity o p e n to fragment i n terpretation 11 . The separation of ! Introduction and application of the result to the premise projected by the elliptical expression in (21 0 ) is arti cial, and I proceed to de ne a process of substitution for ellipsis construal through the concept of metadeclarative u n i t . For the simple case, for some fragment m : e we shall have a database with at least one assumption also of type e n : e, and a process manipulating that database by substitution of the premise n : e by the premise m : e (24) Jo had to decide that the dog should go, on behalf of his mother who was sick.
And that the house should be sold too. (25) Jo insisted on deciding swiftly that the dog should go. But not that the house should be sold.
The rule we require is IX, a substitution process de ned to apply to any minor premise k : A, where A is simple, but k is a metadeclarative unit of arbitrary complexity.
The rule is a con ation of the generalised Modus-Ponens and Introduction rules V and VI:
11 This analysis will correctly predict that pronouns construed as dependent on the item being substituted will be reconstrued in the elliptical fragment a s i n ( i ) (i) Jo i worries that he i 's sick. Bill too It makes no allowance for readings in which only some instances of the substituend are removed: (i) Jo told his mother that he was sick. Bill too. (i) allows an interpretation in which the fragment is construed as`Bill told John's mother that Bill was sick'. Since these mixed readings arise only with pronominal-containing de nite N P s, I reconstruct them via the modelling of the referential/attributive distinction associated with de nites. cf. fn. 23. 506 i`x : B and B is an elementary type j`y : B j : B corresponds to the fragment w i t h y the label of the formula projected from it simple or composite. i : B is the assumption which is to be withdrawn. : t is the conclusion established from the antecedent c l a u s e b y steps of Modus Ponens from i : B and other premises. ( y) : t is the new conclusion. The rule applies just as the simpler forms of ! Intro II, VI|directly a box-exiting and substitution process for a database whose conclusion depends on a sequence of steps of ! Elim. 12 
Bare argument fragments: deriving the syntactic restrictions
The analysis of bare argument ellipsis has so far been shown to successfully account for data equally characterisable by the rst-order uni cation account o f P r ust et al and the higher order uni cation account of Dalrymple et al. The di erence has been only that the natural deduction perspective p r o vides a procedural basis to the explanation, preserving all elements of structure through the incremental record provided by the labels. However, we now see the empirical advantage of the proof-theoretic form of explanation. Con gurational restrictions on the interpretation process can be explained in terms of the proof discipline without invocation of externally imposed syntactic principles (unlike the semantic uni cation accounts). In particular, the lack of reconstruction across a relative clause boundary follows directly. Like the target speci cation induced by wh, the presentation of a fragment also imposes a requirement on some local reasoning task: the substitution to be made must be substitution to a particular local database. As with wh dependencies, the relative-clause island phenomenon follows from the local nature of this requirement. The interpretation of (26) licenses the substitution of Mary for the woman who likes Bill or for Joan, b u t not for Bill.
(26) The woman who likes Bill visited Joan. And Mary too. 12 Notice that though this process is reducible to a step of ! Intro plus a step of ! Elim, it is strictly a construction process, used solely to create structure for the projection from some minor premise : e onto some requisite conclusion of the form ( ) : t. Following Sperber and Wilson 45] we restrict the use of ! Intro so that it has this function exclusively. S u c h a restriction is necessary, for without it, the rules would predict 'like(Jo)(Mary):t' to be derivable as an interpretation for the string Sue likes Mary, Joan by injudicious application of ! Intro to an intermediate conclusion`like(Mary)(Sue):t'. Worse, an in nite loop of such applications would be available. A consequence of this restriction is that we preclude type-lifting, a move w h i c h forces an account of determiners in terms of a direct mapping onto arbitrary names. ) the database s 1 contains both the fragment and the full database s 2 projected from the previous sentence. In s 2 the occurrence of Bill may not be selected as the point of substitution for Mary:e. The required restriction follows from the form of ! Intro (hence substitution). Consider the problem posed by trying to remove the name Bill from s 2 by a s t e p o f ! Intro. ! Intro by de nition licenses the removal of an assumption : e from some database i if the creation of that assumption has led by !Elim step(s) in i to some conclusion ( ) : t. But the presence of Bill in s 2 is not the result of any step of reasoning derivable by the local ! logic. To the contrary, i t critically involved a step of the global discipline correlating databases, a step which i s not characterised within the ! Logic. Indeed Bill:e is not a premise of s 2 at all. It is a label contained in s 2 in virtue of an operation de ned solely through the labelling algebra for two independent databases with no alteration to the premise structure of 508 Ellipsis in a Labelled Deduction System the host database. But a local logic contained within some global logic framework is by de nition blind to any steps of that global discipline. ! Intro will accordingly not be able to apply to the output of any process unless it is a process licensed within the local ! Logic. An element in some database as the result of any LINK operation will not therefore be able to provide the basis for interpreting a fragment b y this process of substitution. 13 14 As with wh-gap dependencies, substitution is possible into relative clauses if the determiner head which provides the point of linkage between the two databases is construed as dependent on the item being replaced, (27) allowing as one possible interpretation of its fragment (27 0 ): (27) I h a ve had a student who studied Mongolian. But not Abkhaz. (27 0 ) I h a ve not had a student who studied Abkhaz.
BARE ARGUMENT FRAGMENTS AS
And the reason is the same. A w ell-formed interpretation across the relative clause boundary is possible only if the name which the inde nite is taken to project is identi ed as dependent on the element being replaced, for it is this identi cation which guarantees that the element to be substituted is in a proof domain which licenses substitution by the newly presented premise. If no such dependency is constructed, substitution of the premise in an independent linked database is impossible, precluded by the limitations imposed by the logic discipline.(Again, Meyer-Viol's extended predicate logic with substitution operators de ned gives the right results here.) As with wh-gap dependencies, all such reconstruction across relative-clause boundaries require t h i s f o r m o f i n terpretation. 15 The asymmetry between reconstruction across relative clause boundaries, and whislands and sentential subjects (cf. examples (6){(11)) automatically follows. The property t h a t wh-islands and sentential subjects share is that the supposed island is a minor premise of the major predicate (complement to predicates such a s wonder in the former case, subject in the latter) and contained within the overall database. Substitution is accordingly correctly predicted to be freely available across these boundaries. This of course creates the puzzle of why there should be such restrictions on wh-gap 13 This analysis is very close to an analysis set within a Uni cation Grammar perspective Gardent 18] . However, in 18] the various restrictions each require a stipulated addition to the basic grammar, whereas here they follow directly from the dynamics of the proof process. 14 The examples from fn.1 require a di erent form of analysis: (i) I h a ve had a friend who works at Selfridges visiting. Sorry Harrods.
(ii)`I will give 3.000 ecus to anyone who has won a grant from a major European company.'`Which European company?' The correction cases as in (i) are arguably substitution of an element in the phonological string. Examples as in (ii), whose full reconstruction is ungrammatical, are inferentially requests for clari cation, a request for an additional speci cation. In being a process of cooperation between speaker and hearer in establishing a single inferential structure, they are not like ellipses phenomena considered so far. In the cases in the text, the elliptical fragment i s used as the basis for creating an entirely new discrete inference structure. It is in such cases that the logic discipline will debar substitution. 15 Such i n terpretations are correctly predicted to be precluded if the relative clause is construed as nonrestrictive: in that case, by analysis, the value to be assigned the variable projected by the determiner is selected prior to the computation of the database and cannot therefore be identi ed as dependent on the gap. Thus, unlike (27) , (i) disallows any i n terpretation of its fragment a s ( i 0 ): (i) I've had to fail a student, who is studying Mongolian. But not Abkhaz. (i 0 ) 6 = I h a ve not had to fail a student who is studying Abkhaz' Cf. Kempson 28] for an account of the distinction between restrictive and nonrestrictive relatives.
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dependency, the sentential subject restriction in particular being a strong restriction observed in all languages. But the solution is to see these as restrictions on the incremental projection of database structure and not a consequence of the logic itself. The sentential subject restriction debars: (28) Who i is that John likes e i surprising? a restriction which only appears with the database in subject position, not if it is postposed: (29) Who i is it surprising that John likes e i ?
The problem in incrementally projecting structure for (28) is displayed by the rst three steps of its interpretation. First the wh expression initiates a new database by imposing on it a goal speci cation. Second, the auxiliary provides a database label plus indication of a premise to be duly annotated as the subject. Thirdly, despite there being no single entry in that database, there is an instruction (projected by t h e complementiser that) to build a node for a new database. The e ect of following this instruction will be that the rst database is not a database|it has no premises in it. If we impose on the construction algorithm the intuitively correct restriction that at all stages the construction process must generate wellformed databases, the sentential subject restriction will duly follow. 16 Violation of such a restriction will notably not arise in ellipsis construal as there is no incremental process of database-building once the fragment itself is entered in the database|merely a step of substitution carried out on a wellformed and complete database. The wh-island restriction precluding Who does she wonder what Bill gave? is much weaker and varies from one wh expression to another. This suggests that the restriction is associated with di culties of goal stacking (and keeping such unful lled goals distinct) a di culty which m i g h t be enhanced or ameliorated by the intrinsic content of the goals in question. As in the case of the sentential subject restriction, this di culty would not arise in ellipsis construal as the process of substitution is de ned over complete databases. With a subset of restrictions on wh-gap dependency independently explained, we have to hand an explanation of the idiosyncratic set of restrictions imposed on bare argument ellipsis, and its partial parallelism with wh-gap dependency without need of any assignment of complex structure as input to the process of interpretation. 17 16 The restriction will also correctly preclude That that she is clever is unclear is unfortunate. 17 Lappin 34] argues that bare argument ellipsis is not subject to con gurational restrictions at all on the grounds that it is not subject to ANY subjacency restriction, even in the case of dependency across a relative clause boundary, citing as evidence: (i) John enjoyed reading the articles which a p p e a r e d i n t h e N e w Y ork Times last week, but not the Daily Telegraph.
(ii) John agreed to the request that he submit articles to the journal, but not book reviews. It is noticeable that (i) contains a de nite article as the relevant head determiner (allowing an analysis along the lines of (27) ) and also that the adjunct last week can be applied as adjunct equally to the superordinate and subordinate clauses, in principle allowing a phrasal interpretation of the two noun phrases. Controlling for both these factors leads to noticeably reduced acceptability of the requisite interpretations as this analysis would predict: (iii) I am enjoying reading most of the articles Alex submitted to the Times last week and the Telegraph too/but not the Telegraph. 
Ellipsis in a Labelled Deduction System
The general pattern is that the interpretation of bare argument ellipsis forms involve a free substitution process restricted only by the dynamics of the proof system within which the substitution process is de ned.
VP Ellipsis as conditional introduction (! S introduction)
VP-ellipsis forms display a di erent range of variation, with a distinct set of available interpretations. As with bare argument ellipsis, the challenge is whether or not these restrictions indicate an analysis of the elliptical form in terms of complex assignment of structure prior to their interpretation. I shall argue that all that is required is manipulation of ! S Introduction. VP ellipsis occurs in various guises|bare auxiliary, a simple in nitive marker, or the pro-verb form do: (30) John has been seeing Mary and Bill has too. (31) John is required to care for Mary but he isn't likely to (32) John was interviewing a student who said she'd never been to America and when I said I had, he turned to me with relief.
There is some di erence between these forms (as observed in Haik 20] ), but the principle patterns are the same. Informally, whatever way t h e i n terpretation is assigned in the antecedent clause is carried over to the interpretation of the elliptical VP form. Thus in (30) . Structures for elliptical expression and antecedent a l i k e are for example projected for the interpretation of (33) in which the elliptical expression is equally construed with a re exive i n terpretation:
(33) Joan washed herself and so did her mother.
However, as pointed out by Dalrymple et al., this approach faces problems with this and all other cases where the invisible counterpart takes more than one form despite no ambiguity in the antecedent clause as there will have t o b e m o r e t h a n o n e Lappin's observation with respect to (ii) is correct, but does not a ect the validity of the analysis here.
(ii) provides an instance of the fact that construction. If, re ecting the meaning of these expressions, they are analysed as projecting the complement clause as a database label to a formu l a o f t ype e (with fact projecting a predicate on that label), the puzzle is not why construal ellipsis licenses substitution into these databases which is correctly predicted but rather why wh gap dependencies are precluded. For the time being I leave this puzzle unresolved.
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di erent assigned indexing for each i n terpretation. The consequence is a commitment to multiple formal ambiguity, not only for the elliptical element itself but for its antecedent, hence any s t r i n g . Additional problems are caused by the evidence that it is not the invisible counterparts of the morphological elements themselves which occur in the elliptical form. This has to be so because as the non-re exive i n terpretation of (33) show s , t h e r e i s a n i n terpretation in which the predicate must not get carried over as`washed herself' but as 'washed Joan'. There are cases of disparity s u c h as this with every type of NP|re exive, pronominal, name, or negative polarity i t e m . If for example the predicate in the rst conjunct of (34) were matched by corresponding elements in the invisible structure of the elliptical VP form, the structure would be debarred by principle C which precludes a name from being co-indexed with any c-commanding pronominal:
(34) I insisted that Sue should be allowed to see John i , and eventually he i agreed that she should.
Examples like these and many others indicate that whatever the matching process is, it is not de ned over terminal elements and in an analysis which so de nes it, an auxiliary process of`vehicle change' has to be de ned to ensure that terminal elements are replaced with some suitable substituend. 18 Invocation of processes of`vehicle change' strongly suggest that the properties associated with elliptical forms are not those of the terminal elements of the preceding string but rather their interpretation and a commitment t o m ultiple formal ambiguity is an immediate consequence of analysing any phenomenon whose intrinsic content is weaker than its contextdependent i n terpretations in terms of discrete forms of input corresponding to those interpretations. 19 Bearing in mind the initial minimum criterion of success I imposed, that cases of underdeterminacy of provided input should be directly modelled, I shall therefore set such s y n tactic analyses aside at least initially, assume with Dalrymple et al. and Pr ust et al. that the phenomenon of ellipsis construal requires an analysis in terms of the interpretation assigned to the elliptical expression rather than to any structure assigned independently of that interpretation process, and seek to derive any extra restrictions on the choice of predicate from the process of recovering the intended interpretation. From the perspective of discourse understanding, VP ellipsis is like bare argument ellipsis in providing an expression which enables the speaker to convey a whole proposition without explicitly presenting the predicate a second time. The predicate can be constructed from any antecedent irrespective o f depth or type of embedding, as (30) { (32) demonstrate. In all straightforward VP ellipsis cases (modulo, that is, antecedent-contained ellipsis), the only restriction on interpretation is imposed by t h e fact that these forms invariably present a fragment annotated as subject, to which the constructed predicate must apply. The relative freedom with which s u c h elliptical expressions may be reconstructed might be taken as evidence that the process of creating such a n i n terpretation has no restrictions apart from the predicate having to involve abstraction with respect to the subject (in all other respects other than this like bare argument ellipsis). Simple examples suggest that this might be correct: (36) John corrected his paper before the teacher did and so did Bill
On the assumption that the subject must shift in interpretation but the co-referential pronoun need not, there is for a sentence such as (36) six possible interpretations f o r a n i n terpretation of the rst conjunct John corrected his paper as`John corrected John's paper':
(i) J corrected J's paper before T corrected J's paper B corrected J's paper before T corrected J's paper (ii) J corrected J's paper before T corrected T's paper B corrected B's paper before T corrected T's paper (iii) J corrected J's paper before T corrected T's paper B corrected J's paper before T corrected T's paper (iv) J corrected J's paper before T corrected J's paper B corrected B's paper before T corrected B's paper (v) J corrected J's paper before T corrected J's paper B corrected B's paper before T corrected J's paper (vi) J corrected J's paper before T corrected J's paper B corrected J's paper before T corrected B's paper (B=Bill, J=John, T=teacher)
The problem is that of these six, only the rst four are possible. (i) is the interpretation in which the pronoun in the rst conjunct is consistently construed as xed referentially and hence held constant (ii) the interpretation in which it is consistently construed as a variable to be rebound by abstraction. (iii) and (iv) involve mixed cases in which the pronoun is rst construed as a variable to be rebound and subsequently as xed, or vice versa. 20 (v) and (vi) are precluded, a distribution which an unrestricted abstraction process (such a s t h a t o f D a l r y m p l e et al.) will not predict. With the di erentiation between two t ypes of ! Elimination, a natural solution is available. Corresponding to the splitting of ! Elimination into a general case and a particular case, there is the second form of ! Introduction ! S Intro (`S' being the annotation`use last' associated with the subject): This will give us part of the VP ellipsis phenomenon|across the board abstraction. In LDS NL : terms, elliptical VP forms project a database structure containing an expression annotated to be used last and a database label determining how the database is to be construed in a ow of time. A l l t h e y l a c k is a one-place predicate:
The phenomenon is as with pronouns a case of under-determinacy, t h e v alue of the label to be chosen on the basis of what is independently available. Intuitively, there are two procedures which the hearer might f o l l o w t o p r o vide such a l a b e l . One is to take some previous database, remove all assumptions about its subject by ! S Intro, and use the resulting predicate as the basis for interpretation. The other is to identify the new predicate as having the same label as the predicate in some previous database (exactly as pronominal construal). Applied to (37), the rst strategy will yield (37'): 2122 from binding theory which distinguishes -occurrences and -occurrences of an index according to whether the index is established referentially (= -occurrence) or as a dependency on some other index (= -occurrence). They de ne a m a t c hing relation between antecedent string with assigned structure and set of indices and the elliptical form with invisible assigned structure and set of indices called`an i-copy', which does not involve s e m a n tic identity but requires matching of -a n d -occurrences of indices. This concept guarantees the carrying over of bound-variable construals of pronouns (normally -occurrences) to some following elliptical form without necessary semantic identity. This concept of i-copy de ned in terms of matching of terminal elements and assigned structure allows up to a certain de ned limit of morphological and structural variation (cf. fn.32). The theory thus provides an index-relative concept of identity which is distinct from either a semantically or a structurally de ned concept of identity. Their analysis assigns a peripheral, marked status to both (iii) and (v) equally, said to require subordination of the second conjunct to the rst. 21 The representation of the genitive i s s c hematic at best, but the approximation is harmless. 22 To distinguish the interpretation of John washed h i s s o cks and so did Bill and John washed J o h n 's socks and so did Bill we shall need to add to the label projected by a name a record of when it was introduced into the database, keeping track of discrete introductions of the same name in much the same way a s k eeping variables discrete. Some following pronoun may then be identi ed as John i for some i, a n d -abstraction will be sensitive to a distinction between John i , John j . This phenomenon is entirely general, all premises requiring an index of occurrence. Such indices have in general been suppressed simply for ease of exegesis. GOAL : t John S : e wash : e ! (e ! S t) f(u) socks(f(u)) : e CHOOSE u = J o h n wash(f(John) socks(f(John)) : e ! S t wash(f(John) socks(f(John))(John) : t x: wash(f(x) socks(f(x))(x) : e ! S t CHOOSE = x:wash(f(x) socks(f(x))(x) : e ! S t wash(f(Bill) socks(f(Bill))(Bill) : t
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The unambiguous rst conjunct is re-used to create by abstraction an interpretation for the elliptical form and hence create the so-called`bound-variable' interpretation.
The second strategy involves simply choosing the label of type e ! S t that is available in the database from that rst conjunct, to wit`wash(f(John), socks(f(John)))'. Formally this process of direct identi cation can be seen as a variant o f ! Introduction, here withdrawing only the premise ( S) : e and not any other occurrences of . We might refer to this as ! S 1 Intro, manipulating a more sensitive abstraction operator 1 : 1 is to be understood as abstracting only the occurrence of which is annotated with the feature S. The result is a one-place predicate in which the only remaining argument needed to create a proposition must be construed as subject. With these two processes of interpretation for a single form of ellipsis, we immediately predict the four possible interpretations of (36) . The interpretation of (36) involves an identi cation process for the temporal adverbial using either ! S Intro or ! S 1 Intro and a second process also using either of these two rules. (i) involves two u s e s o f ! S 1 Intro. (ii) involves two u s e s o f ! S Intro. (iii) involves the use of ! S 1 Intro followed by application of ! S Intro, (iv) the converse. There is no independent i n terpretation of the adjunct in the interpretation of the second conjunct, for each ! S Introduction process takes the conclusion of some established database and abstracts the subject from it, and no mixed cases are allowed other than those licensed by the application of these two processes. In particular, no abstraction is allowed other than either acrossthe-board abstraction or from subject position alone and (v) and (vi) are precluded. 23 The choice of a resource label S for de ning the concept of subject has had the happy consequence of predicting the right restricted set of interpretations. 24 
VP ellipsis and syntactic restrictions
The major restrictions on VP ellipsis purporting to show its syntactic basis also follow from this account, in particular the observed subjacency e ects. 25 The signi cance of these data is that it is these which provide the principal evidence (Haik 20] , 23 Mixed cases which are not covered by these rules arise with de nite NPs containing pronominals: (i) John said his mother was worried about him and so did Fred. (i) allows an interpretation in which F red is reported as having said that John's mother was worried about Fred. These cases are covered by the independent necessity of treating de nite NPs as having interpretations in which they are rigidly referential expressions, e ectively names, the predicate`his mother' in the rst conjunct of (i) used to set up a name which uniquely picks out John's mother (the traditional referential/attributive distinction of Donnellan 13] ). If the hearer inferentially makes this additional step, subsequent abstraction will not a ect this name. What this account correctly predicts is that pronouns, hav i n g n o s u c h predicative c o n tent, will never be subject to this additional step of interpretation, and so the possibility o f i n terpreting the second conjunct of (i) as`Fred said that Fred's mother was worried about John' is precluded (contrary to the Fiengo and May 14] account). 24 Examples due to Dahl 1972 such a s John thinks he's clever so does Bill though Bill's wife does not (with an interpretation in which Bill thinks that he Bill is clever though his wife does not think that he is clever) pose no problem of principle for this account, predicting as it does that interpretations are projected from the previous database by one or other form of abstraction. All that is required in this case is a shift from one type of abstraction to the other, a shift which given relevance considerations would predict to be somewhat more marked than merely repeating the strategy used in establishing an interpretation for the second conjunct. The concept of relevance I am here presuming on is that of Sperber and Wilson 45] , who de ne a principle of relevance as the presumption that hearers will invariably interpret utterances by engaging in the least cognitive e ort for the intended interpretation. The preclusion of an interpretation in which Bill's wife does not think that John is clever is also predicted on relevance grounds. Relevance considerations, given the Sperber and Wilson de nition, dictate that the only possible interpretation for some under-determined element i s t h e i n terpretation which is the most salient ( e v aluating competinginterpretations itself involves cognitive e ort, and is debarred). Given the sequence of conjuncts explicitly presented, with the third presented as subordinate to the second, the only available interpretation of the third is that which is established by using the interpretation assigned to the second. That these preferences are due exclusively to salience considerations is con rmed by examples such a s John thinks he's been maligned. So, incidentally, does Bill. However John's wife doesn't, so they will be taking no action. With the use of incidentally explicitly marking the second conjunct as not of primary importance, the interpretation of the second elliptical VP from the rst conjunct becomes available as predicted. 25 Examples with expletive subjects are observed by Lappin to be problematic for standard semantic accounts of VP anaphora|e.g. Dalrymple et al. 12], Hardt 21 ], such a s It's obvious that John's right even if John doesn't think that it is. H o wever if we assign obvious the type e ! t as expected, allow expletive subjects to project a label for the type e which is empty other than a`use last' annotation, and assume that the immediately follow ing database has no assigned type, the only possible resolution will be for that following database to be taken to provide the missing label for the premise preceding obvious, it will then duly be identi ed as`John's right' and the elliptical VP by direct identi cation will be construed as`obvious'. An account v ery similar to the present one is Pr ust et al., Lappin 33] ) that an account of VP ellipsis has to be in terms of syntactic structure. Thus sensitivity to fact that constructions (39) , wh-islands (40) , and relative clause constructions (41) all appear to be displayed by a n tecedent-contained VP ellipsis, and suggest that the elliptical forms must be analysed as containing occurrences of the wh gap in order that the strings can be debarred in terms of the presence of some illicit gap in structures where it is not licensed: The LDS NL account a voids this problem in virtue of the fact that the elliptical VP in the relative clause is interpreted from an independent linked database as part of the process of establishing the predicate within which it appears to be contained. The process of interpreting (38) in LDS NL terms is displayed in (38 0 ) (assuming an analysis in which determiners project onto variables, every onto a meta-variable x ranging over free variables x y : : :). (38 0 ) presents the interpretation up to the point immediately prior to the point at which s o m e c hoice has to be made to complete the premise : e ! S t :
who present a rst-order uni cation account of VP ellipsis, but they explicitly advocate that this account a p p l i e s exclusively to so-called discourse phenomena and leave on one side as subject to syntax-internal explanation all cases which i n volve structural restrictions on their interpretation such as bound-variable construals of pronominals and antecedent-contained VP ellipsis. The only predicate available which gives rise to a well-formed interpretation for : e ! S t is the database of premises fread:e ! (e ! S t) x, book(x) : eg, and this is what the hearer chooses. As a result of this choice, the conclusioǹ say(read(x,book(x))(Sue))(Bill)' will duly be derived in s 2 the LINK target on s 2 will thus be satis ed and the composite restriction`book(x) & s a y(read(x,book(x))(Sue)) (Bill)' entered in s 1 as the result of the LINK inference rule. The result here emerges from three factors: (i) linked databases are by de nition independent of the host database to which they are linked (ii) the elliptical form in this ty p e o f c a s e i s c o nstructed as part of the process of building the linked database in question (iii) the inference which leads to an added restriction on some variable which is induced by t h e linked database only applies after that database successfully leads to some conclusion : t. In consequence of these, an interpretation can be projected from the structure directly projected from the string without threat of circularity. At t h e p o i n t d 2 0 in s 3 at which is to be instantiated, the computation of the database to be linked in to d 3 nM is not complete, so the restriction on the variable which that computation will provide is not yet entered into the database s 1 . The hearer is therefore able to choose fread:e ! (e ! S t) (x book(x)) : eg from s 1 as providing a value for , with the premise containing the variable x only bearing the restriction book(x), no associated restriction from the linked database yet being available. No circularity results from this process. Indeed this choice of predicate is essential in order both to ful l the target speci cation imposed on s 2 (and s 3 ), and through the inference rule VII to derive t h e w ellformed result of an additional occurrence of x|`say(read(x, book(x))(Sue))(Bill)'|within the proof domain s 1 in which i t w as introduced. Hence the licit antecedent-contained VP anaphora in (38) . 26 The island-violating e ect of VP reconstruction in (39){(41) follows exactly as whgap binding with no VP ellipsis present, for the wh in all cases will project a goal speci cation and realisation of this speci cation will have to satisfy all the restrictions imposed by the goal-directed construction process exactly as in the general case. The following VP anaphor does not change the status of the already imposed target. In (41) for example, the database containing the elliptical VP form will never be computed because the database to which i t s h o u l d b e l i n k ed is in violation of its own target (projected from which Bill recommended t h e b ook) and the database containing the elliptical form is independent of the database to which it should be linked and cannot constitute a domain for constructing the necessary assumption|all exactly as in island-violating cases with no ellipsis. A similar explanation is available in all the other cases. Whatever restriction debars the incremental projection of a wh expression followed by its gap will debar these cases, given the presence of the wh expression and the associated goal speci cation it projects. The interest of these cases of antecedentcontained ellipsis lies in the fact that the explanation turns on the assumption that the process of interpretation itself projects structure. It is this which has enabled an explanation of the structural restrictions on interpretation of elliptical forms without circularity and without abandoning the assumption that all forms of VP ellipsis have 26 The scope e ects arising from restrictions on the construal of free variables in elliptical constructions can be predicted from the twin assumptions (i) that proof domains are de ned to be labelled databases, (ii) that determiners such a s every project a variable free within one such proof domain. If the clause which c o n tains the elliptical expression can serve to project a database as label to a database projected from its adjoining clause so that both antecedent database-structure and the structure projected by the elliptical expression are within the same proof domain, then a variable introduced in the adjoining clause will be carried over construed as the very same variable. Thus John saw everyone when Bill did is ambiguous because when clauses may act as label to the main clause and if they so act then the variable x projected by everyone will be held constant in the reconstructed elliptical predicate. If however the two clauses are taken as independent proof domains, the construction of the elliptical VP will be construed as a predicate with a free variable in that new proof domain and so be construed as separately quanti ed. This possibility i s a vailable for both strategies for ellipsis construal, hence the four-way ambiguity o f John explained his theory to everyone in the Department when Bill did. B y c o n trast, with the quanti er in the when clause and the elliptical form in the main clause, the quanti er in the predicate has to be construed as independently quanti ed|When John interviewed everyone Bill did is unambiguous. This is because the database acting as a label is itself a labelled database and hence a proof domain independent of the database it labels. The results parallel the asymmetry for pronominal dependence, cf. fn.6. In all cross-clausal relations|unless they project such a single proof domain|a variable in a predicate will be construed as requanti ed under ellipsis reconstruction and VP ellipsis construal across and and because, for example yields unambiguous results: (i) John saw e v eryone and so did Bill (ii) John interviewed everyone because Bill did.
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y: see(x)(y)] is carried over from the rst conjunct of (i), providing a variable free in the new database. Hence the e ect of requanti cation. Again the data parallel the potential for anaphoric dependence across these clausal boundaries. This analysis will extend without modi cation to the examples which are problematic for the Dalrymple et al. account with a pronominal in the antecedent predicate that gets construed in the new database as a variable bound in that new domain: Everyone in Sarah's class wants her to go out with him, but none of them think that she will. Notice that the restriction on the variable is held constant, as this analysis would predict. (58) This is the book on pornography w h i c h John managed to read before hearing the teachers' decision that he 8 < :
was not to be allowed to they would all try and ensure that he did not. they would all try and ensure that he shouldn't do so (59) This is the book on pornography which John read before he saw the teacher who had insisted that 8 < :
he wasn't to. he must not. he mustn't do so.
(60) This is the book on pornography which John read while wondering why his teacher had told him 8 < :
not to. that he must not. that he mustn't do so.
According to the LDS NL analysis (52){(54) are unlike (58){(60) and unlike (39){ (41) because no initially imposed goal speci cation drives the interpretation process. Given the very much greater acceptability of (58){(60) over (52)- (54), I take the present analysis as con rmed. 30 31 30 Lappin 33, 34] argues on the basis of (i){(iii) that both parasitic gaps and elliptical VPs containing parasitic gaps are subject to an identical locality condition expressed by C o n treras 8] as the restriction that the gap be 1-subjacent to the true gap (a restriction which he claims cannot be reduced to any semantic form of explanation): (i) This is the performance which John attended in order to review.
(ii) This is the performance which John attended after coming in order to review. (iii) This is the play which J o h n s a w before Bill went because he wanted to. (iii) is ungrammatical on the interpretation in which the elided VP =`John saw e'. However, even granting the need for a locality restriction on the gaps which are parasitic on a wh induced goal-speci cation, there is evidence that reconstructing a secondary gap in an elliptical VP form is not subject to this restriction, con rming the analysis of parasitic gaps in VP ellipsis suggested here: (iv) This is the play which i John wrote about e i despite having gone to a concert in order to avoid having to write about e i . (v) This is the play w h i c h i John wrote about e i despite having gone to a concert in order to avoid having to. (vi) This is the play which i John wrote about e i despite having gone to a concert in order to avoid having to write about it i . (vii) This is the memo i which John wrote e i because Bill j left the o ce so that he j wouldn't have t o e i . (viii) This is the memo i which John wrote e i because Bill j left the o ce so that he j wouldn't have to write e i . (ix) This is the memo i which John wrote e i because Bill j left the o ce so that he j wouldn't have t o w r i t e i t i . According to this analysis, (v) and (vii) are like (vi) and (ix) in allowing an interpretation which is not driven by any imposed goal speci cation, and hence not subject to restrictions imposed by such speci cation. The distinction between (iii) and (v) and (vii) seems to be due to a contrast between before adjunct clauses and causal adjuncts. I have no explanation for this. 31 Some speakers report a gradation in acceptability with the do so forms being markedly more acceptable than either the bare auxiliary or bare in nitive forms. Lappin 34] reports that most speakers record increased acceptability with parasitic gaps under ellipsis, but still a noticeable di erence between these and the full pronominal form of do so anaphora, which is fully acceptable. The distinct lexical inputs of these di erent forms of VP ellipsis provide some basis for explaining this. Do so forms exactly parallel pronominal anaphora. The predicate form : e ! t is explicitly projected, and all that is required is instantiating the metavariable on the basis of independently accessible labels. The bare auxiliary and bare to forms however induce a skeletal structure which they themselves fail to ll. The to in nitive in particular induces the building of an incomplete database which it does not provide at all. Such incomplete forms tend to encourage the interpretation of the elliptical element v i a w ord strings from which t o project the structure, hence inducing a genuine parasitic gap.
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The overall advantage of using incrementally projected proof-theoretic structure as the basis for VP ellipsis interpretation has been two-fold. On the one hand, the analysis has greater structure than a model-theoretic semantic account and so is able to reconstruct con gurational restrictions while retaining the insight that the elliptical VP is reconstructed from the interpretation of its antecedent. Furthermore, the use of resource labelling to de ne the concept of subject has had the immediate advantage of predicting a narrowe r r a n g e o f i n terpretations for elliptical expressions than a free semantic process of abstraction. On the other hand the analysis, though closely allied to a syntactic reconstruction of ellipsis in its direct modelling of wh gaps as constructed premises, correctly reconstructs interpretation of VP ellipsis as matching the interpretation of anaphoric elements in the antecedent, not their morphological form. Unlike the syntax-based accounts of VP ellipsis, no ancillary`vehicle change' process is required: the phenomenon is simply a re ex of the way i n w h i c h structure as interpretation is built up. The analysis has, furthermore, an intrinsic dynamism not shared by s-structure reconstruction of the ellipsis phenomena which a voids the problem posed by a n tecedent-contained VP ellipsis. S-structure reconstruction of VP ellipsis is statically de ned over the output of syntactic con guration-building process. Hence the circularity of reconstruction of antecedent-contained VP ellipsis. On this analysis, in which structures as interpretation are built up incrementally, VP ellipsis, like all underdetermined elements, is enriched on the basis of representations available at the point of its construal in the projection of content. The choice of value for the elliptical expression may therefore be a structure which is itself subject to further enrichment as in the cases threatening circularity, s o t h e a n tecedent-contained cases can be seen as no more than a subcase of a unitary VP-ellipsis phenomenon. Finally, the analysis retains the insight that the input to interpretation of all elliptical expressions corresponds solely to that projected by t h e expression itself, an insight w h i c h all syntactic approaches signally fail to capture. No concept of formal ambiguity i s invoked associated with syntactic assignment of indices. The di erent i n terpretations arise solely from the form and content o f the provided input and the way i n which choices are made during the process of interpretation.
VP Ellipsis: the general picture
Comparing VP|and bare-argument ellipsis, we h a ve analysed both as projecting an input which under-determines the output interpretation very considerably, b o t h s u c h inputs requiring a structural process of interpretation. These structural processes of interpretation are both de ned in terms of ! Intro, the one a substitution process founded on ! Intro, the other the process of ! S Intro. In being de ned as a local box-exit rule, both are subject to locality conditions|neither allowing reconstruction into relative clauses. 32 Despite similarities in the process of their construction, the two processes nonetheless di er, and the di erences between them are also predictable. 32 Wescoat 49] claims that dependency into relative clauses in constructing the interpretation of fragments should not be precluded on the grounds that the analysis must re ect the parallelism between fragment and expressions of the type the same goes for Bill, and this latter form does allow reconstruction into relative clauses, as in the natural interpretation of John dislikes every city which has an air pollution problem. The same goes for water pollution. H o wever arguably the parallelism is solely semantic, the same triggering a much freer one-place predicate construction process independent of the combinatorial restrictiveness imposed by the syntactic type system of types as formulae (cf. Rooth 44] who also argues that the same triggers a free process of predicate construction, not syntactically constrained).
524 Ellipsis in a Labelled Deduction System They follow from the di erent forms that the elliptical element presents. From a concatenated database, the bare argument fragment presents merely a minor premise and therefore requires abduction of some total database structure into which the new premise is substituted. This reconstruction is con rmed by the required use of the word too, and, or but not, of which but not and too both encode the information that the sequence which they precede/follow is a concatenated database (note the unacceptability of John interviewed everyone who Bill did too). An elliptical VP form, on the other hand, by itself presenting a database and some minimal structure, licenses a freer identi cation process but subject to greater stringency in the form of label to be constructed: the label must be associated with a major premise which can combine with a premise annotated with the S restriction that it be used last. Moreover, when the elliptical form combines with other forms such a s wh expressions in antecedent-contained VP ellipsis, the range of available interpretations is exactly that predicted by the combination. The shift from a model-theoretic to a prooftheoretic construal gives exactly the richness of structure required, not just for the purpose of predicting the process of interpreting elliptical forms, but for predicting also varying con gurational limits on such i n terpretation. The assumptions de nitive of the LDS NL framework have been central to this explanation. It was the composite form of label-plus-formula which enabled us to absorb semantic compilation into a syntactic process of interpretation, preserving semantic insights while enriching them with procedural information about how the truth-theoretic content i s projected. It has been the greater richness of vocabulary made available by the complex of labelling algebra, type speci cation and the dynamics of the proof process, that has enabled us to retain the insight that fragment ellipsis, VP-ellipsis, intransitive verbs. and even wh-expressions, all constitute oneplace predicates while nevertheless predicting their di erences in associated structural properties. It is the proof discipline of the local conditional logic and the distinction between it and the global discipline in which it is embedded that have enabled us to explain the parallelism between wh-gap dependency and ellipsis, and the extent to which in bare argument ellipsis that parallelism is incomplete. It has been the use of resource labelling for control purposes which p r o vided the basis of restrictions on the otherwise free process of substitution in VP ellipsis. It has been the system of proof construction from a mixed meta-language/object-language input, subject to progressive instantiation of metavariables, which p r o vided the basis of the procedural account of ellipsis paralleling anaphora, modelling them all as instances of some underdetermined input with subsequent processes of enrichment of that input. So it is that in this framework we bring together the assignment of structure to a string, the provision of an associated interpretation, and the modelling of how the string is interpreted in context. All three are the incremental proof-theoretic projection of structure to a string on a left-right basis through the sequence of words.
